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The September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States 
sparked renewed interest from social scientific, rhetorical, and 
critical/cultural scholars in how communication theory can inform 
current intelligence and national security debates (Corman, 
Trethewey & Goodall, 2008; Goodall, 2006; Hartnett & Stengrim, 
2004; Mitchell, 2002). The U.S. military shares this interest. 
Organizations including the CIA, the U.S. Air Force, and the 
National Defense Intelligence College have recently begun assessing 
and compiling elements of rhetorical theory that can be used to 
improve intelligence analysis (Bean, 2009; Mills, 2003; Woodward, 
2009). Accordingly, in 2003, the Air University published an essay 
written by Air Force Major Gary H. Mills entitled: “The Role of 
Rhetorical Theory in Military Intelligence Analysis: A Soldier’s 
Guide to Rhetorical Theory.” In this essay, Major Mills argues that 
Michel Foucault’s rhetorical theory “serves as a powerful military-
intelligence force multiplier” (p. xvii).  
My aim is to understand the meaning, accuracy, and 
implications of Major Mills’s statement. Toward this end, I first 
engage the literature surrounding Foucault’s ideas concerning the 
interrelationships among power, knowledge, and discourse and 
review arguments in favor of connecting Foucault’s ideas with 
rhetorical theory.  I then analyze how Major Mills applies 
Foucault’s ideas to the study of military intelligence analysis. I do 
this to assess whether his application makes good sense in light of 
existing scholarship concerning Foucault’s relation to rhetoric.  I 
then move beyond the specific case Major Mills provides to 
examine the broader implications of Foucault’s ideas in relation to 
U.S. national security organizing. I conclude by summarizing the 
overall importance of these ideas for scholars and intelligence 
practitioners.
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Foucault and Rhetoric
Although Foucault rarely wrote or spoke about “rhetoric,” the 
arguments in favor of connecting Foucault’s ideas with rhetorical 
theory are well-established and wide-ranging (Biesecker, 1992; 
Bizzell & Herzberg, 2001; Blair, 1987, 1995; Blair & Cooper, 1987; 
Foss & Gill, 1987; Hardy & Phillips, 2004; Herzberg, 1991; Mills, 
2003). According to Bizzell and Herzberg, “Though Foucault avoids 
talking about rhetoric, preferring discourse as his comprehensive 
term, his theory addresses a number of ideas that are central to 
modern rhetoric. He makes a powerful argument that discourse … 
is epistemic [and] a form of social action” (Bizzell & Herzberg, 
2001, p. 1434).  Bizzell and Herzberg note that Foucault also 
addresses issues of context and demonstrates how the 
“microphysics of power” reside in laws, regulations, texts, and 
architecture that not only affect, but form, individuals. Scholars 
have used Foucault’s theories to address rhetorical problems 
involving not only the epistemology of the knowledge/power 
relation, but resistance, human choice, and freedom.
Despite the uptake of Foucault’s ideas within the 
communication discipline, Biesecker (1992), Blair (1995), and Blair 
and Cooper (1987) also note a tension concerning the 
appropriateness of Foucault’s theories to the study of rhetoric given 
his perceived diminution of the “self-determining subject” in favor 
of powerful “discursive formations.”  Blair argues that taking 
Foucault’s ideas seriously requires questioning basic assumptions 
about rhetoric (1995).  A Foucauldian perspective maintains, for 
example, that “interpreting a text provides little in the way of 
understanding how it performs in the world, and … rhetors are 
multidimensional voices who speak their institutional situatedness 
as well as their minds” (Blair, 1995, p. 122).  According to Blair, the 
concept of “institutional situatedness” is one of Foucault’s major 
contributions to the study of rhetoric.
Before examining the concept of “institutional situatedness” in 
the context of U.S. intelligence, it will be useful to briefly elaborate 
Foucault’s ideas concerning the interconnection between discourse, 
power, and knowledge. The “episteme,” which Foucault later 
termed “discursive formation,” is critical for understanding the 
relationship between these three concepts. A discursive formation 
is a pattern of statements which constitute a system of knowledge 
in a given historical era. A discursive formation can be thought of as 
a cultural code, structure, or framework for knowledge constituted 
within a body of discourse or discursive practices (Foss & Gill, 1987, 
p. 387). Foucault’s Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 
(1977) illustrates these interrelationships. The power of the penal 
system within Western society gives rise to a discourse of 
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criminology.  In turn, that power-laden and authoritative discourse 
allows the institutions of the penal system to define criminality and 
to perpetuate certain rules, roles, and practices.  For Foucault, 
teasing out which came first, power, knowledge, or discourse is 
irrelevant.  They are reciprocal.
Sites of Intelligence
In “The Formation of Enunciative Modalities,” Chapter 4 of The 
Archeology of Knowledge, Foucault attempts to discover “the place 
from which [discourses] come” (Foucault, 1972, p. 50). Foucault’s 
discussion in this chapter explains the concept of institutional 
situatedness that Blair identifies as being critical to Foucault’s 
contribution to rhetoric (Blair, 1995).  Specifically, in the beginning 
of the chapter, Foucault asks a fundamental question about 
discourse: “Who is speaking?” By this, Foucault means to draw 
attention to the status, sanction, and rights of speakers within a 
discursive formation. Foucault uses the example of nineteenth-
century doctors to illustrate this point. The status of the doctor is 
generally a rather special one in all forms of society and civilization; 
he is hardly ever an undifferentiated or interchangeable person. 
Medical statements cannot come from anybody; their value, 
efficacy, even their therapeutic powers, and, generally speaking, 
their existence as medical statements cannot be dissociated from 
the statutorily-defined person who has the right to make them 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 50). It is not difficult to see how this issue 
applies to institutional discourse within the U.S. intelligence and 
national security arena.  Pronouncements about an adversary’s 
military capabilities and intentions cannot come from just anyone.  
A sophisticated and hierarchical system of analyst education, 
training, vetting, promotion, and evaluation ensures that the 
“consensus” of the U.S. intelligence community carries authority 
and is understood by the president, national security advisors, and 
the public to be analogous with the “truth” as best as it can be 
known. The perception of intelligence analysis as an elite, insular, 
and objective activity must be cultivated in order to bolster both the 
legitimacy of intelligence and the exercise of presidential power.
In a related argument, Foucault explains in The Archeology of 
Knowledge the importance of institutional sites of discourse and 
the positioning of subjects in relation to various domains or groups 
of objects. By institutional sites, Foucault means the physical 
locations wherein discourse derives added legitimacy. In the case of 
nineteenth-century doctors, relevant institutional sites included the 
hospital, private practice offices, the laboratory, and medical 
libraries. During the nineteenth-century, the relative importance of 
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these sites declined as developments in medical science, industry, 
and technology altered institutional dynamics.
The importance of institutional sites within the discourse of 
intelligence and national security is perhaps even greater than in 
the medical profession; only a handful of physical locations serve as 
legitimate sites of official intelligence discourse (i.e., CIA 
headquarters, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National 
Security Agency, etc.).  These sites influence, or perhaps constitute, 
a subject’s ability to question, listen, see, observe, and use 
“instrumental intermediaries that modify the scale of … 
information, shift the subject in relation to the average or 
intermediate perceptual level” (Foucault, 1972, p. 52). Foucault’s 
discussion of the modalities of enunciation—utterability, 
speakability—helps us understand Blair’s statement that “rhetors 
are multidimensional voices who speak their institutional 
situatedness” (1995, p. 122). Specifically, for Foucault, the 
emergence of clinical medicine (and other institutional discourses) 
cannot be simply regarded as a set of new practices resulting from 
changes in ideas or technologies. Instead, clinical medicine must be 
seen as the establishment of relations between a number of distinct 
elements including the status of doctors, institutional sites, and the 
subject’s position.  Foucault states, “I shall abandon any attempt, 
therefore, to see discourse as a phenomenon of expression—the 
verbal translation of a previously established synthesis; instead, I 
shall look for a field of regularity for various positions of 
subjectivity” (Foucault, 1972, p. 55).
The idea of institutional situatedness thus helps to explain how 
cultural and organizational context shapes subjectivity. The concept 
of “exteriority” complements this idea and extends it to “texts.” 
Exteriority is the idea that a “text” (defined here as a relatively 
permanent inscription, especially of words) stabilizes or 
destabilizes a discursive formation rather than serving as a 
container of meaning.  Put another way, exteriority “opposes the 
interpretation of a text and looks instead for the external conditions 
of its existence” (Herzberg, 1991, p. 73). The concept of exteriority is 
important within the study of intelligence and national security 
because, in one sense, intelligence texts (e.g., the President’s Daily 
Brief or the National Intelligence Estimate) correspond to 
Foucault’s assertion that authorial biography is a problematic 
interpretive device. This explains why there are no “by-lines” on the 
most influential intelligence “products.”  Foucault helps us 
understand how true it is that the institution of U.S. intelligence 
authors them. 
The concepts of discursive formation, institutional situatedness, 
and exteriority point to two important aspects of power and 
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knowledge.  First, an actor is powerful only within a particular 
discursive context because discourse creates the roles from which 
power can be exercised (Hardy & Phillips, 2004, p. 303). Second, 
rhetoric is epistemic, i.e., rhetoric creates knowledge rather than 
revealing preexisting and objective phenomena. For example, Foss 
and Gill, focusing on discursive practices, rules, roles, power, and 
knowledge to generate a “middle-level,” theory of rhetoric as 
epistemic, apply this theory to the case of Disneyland in order to 
understand how Disneyland works as a discursive formation (Foss 
& Gill, 1987).  Foss and Gill’s application of Foucault’s theory to the 
case of Disneyland will later be shown in this essay to be useful for 
understanding how power, discourse, and knowledge converge 
within the national security arena.  The point at present is that their 
treatment of Foucault’s theories is similar to Major Mills’s in that 
both seek to bring Foucault down from the realm of theoretical 
speculation to a level of concrete application.  Bearing this in mind, 
we may now explore Major Mills’s application of Foucault.
Major Mills, Michel Foucault, and the Study of Military 
Intelligence Analysis
“The Role of Rhetorical Theory in Military Intelligence Analysis: A 
Soldier’s Guide to Rhetorical Theory” was published in 2003 by the 
Air University Press at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The Air 
University is a component of the Air Education and Training 
Command and is the Air Force’s center for professional military 
education. In 2003, Major Mills was serving as a senior intelligence 
analyst at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. He had 
previously served as an assistant professor of English at the United 
States Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado. According 
to the Director of the Air University Library, the purpose of “The 
Role of Rhetorical Theory” is to “share Major Mills’s rhetorical 
understanding with young officers attending initial intelligence 
training [and] a broader audience of traditional university students 
and instructors” (Mills, 2003, p. ix). Major Mills’s essay is 
significant for two reasons. First, it has been promoted by the Air 
University as a “Fairchild Paper,” which serves as a mark of 
distinction within the Air University system. Second, it is possibly 
the only publicly available document produced by the U.S. military 
that discusses the role of rhetorical theory, ancient, modern, or 
postmodern, within intelligence analysis (for a related discussion, 
however, see Keller & Mitchell, 2006). The essay thus provides a 
window into the secretive world of intelligence analysis and 
suggests how rhetorical theory might be appropriated within that 
domain. 
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Major Mills’s essay contains eight chapters intersecting 
rhetorical theory with intelligence analysis. The central focus of the 
essay involves linking Foucault’s theories of power and 
discontinuity to intelligence processes. The three chapters 
specifically covering Foucault’s theories are entitled “[What the] 
Foucault?” “Power Plug,” and “Discontinuity Fever.” The text 
constructs Major Mills’s military intelligence (and presumably 
masculine) audience as one inherently skeptical of rhetorical theory  
and Foucault’s ideas.  Here we reach one of my main points. 
Through bold assertions, Major Mills builds a counter ethos to 
Foucault that, ideally, allows Mills to circumvent the anticipated 
objections of his readers. For example, Major Mills states: 
“Foucault never served in the military; however, his firsthand 
occupation experience and painstaking study of history, human 
behavior, and—most importantly—power, made him a social and 
intellectual tactician of the highest order” (2003, pp. 21-22). Few 
readers would argue with Major Mills’s observation that 
“underpinning the entire spectrum of conflict is a complex, ever-
shifting flow of power, ruptures, and discontinuity” (p. 24). 
Nevertheless, Major Mills’s incongruous attempt to “operationalize” 
Foucault’s theories in the context of intelligence analysis creates 
problems. Mills himself acknowledges that “Foucault would frown 
upon this ‘institutional’ use of his power analysis,” yet this situation 
does not prevent him from praising Foucault as a “very reluctant, 
unintentional military tactician” (pp. 22-23). Certainly, Foucault’s 
ideas are open to wide interpretation. But Foucault’s theoretical 
program was focused on social change.  So, at its very core, Major 
Mills’s application necessarily distorts aspects of Foucault’s 
theories in order to make them amenable to preconceived 
intelligence doctrine.
For example, in Chapter 4, “[What the] Foucault,” Major Mills 
introduces readers to Foucault’s theories.  He takes for granted that  
intelligence analysts will be unfamiliar with Foucault, and he tries 
to link basic Foucauldian concepts to core intelligence processes. 
He states, “Foucault understood the critical pivotal elements and 
practices of society: his most general aim was to ‘discover the point 
at which these practices … became coherent reflective techniques 
with definite goals … and came to be seen as true’” (p. 23).  This 
passage, like others quoted or cited from Foucault’s work, is 
interpretively flexible.  Elsewhere, Major Mills cites passages from 
Foucault that are downright incomprehensible.  He acknowledges 
that readers will puzzle over such passages. As a result, he peppers 
his essay with reassuring tongue-in-cheek lines such as, “You may 
be asking, ‘What the Foucault?’” (p. 24).  Despite the difficulty in 
understanding Foucault’s concepts, however, Major Mills keeps 
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enticing his readers: “Foucault can help you better understand the 
elusive human element of conflict—and the analysis of human 
struggles” (p. 25).
In Chapter 5, “Power Plug,” Mills begins to apply Foucault’s 
theory of power to intelligence analysis. “Since you are intelligence 
specialists,” he states, “understanding the power in both your and 
the adversary’s capabilities and systems is extremely critical” (p. 
28).  He largely ignores the role intelligence analysts themselves 
play in perpetuating the power of the national security apparatus, 
writing as though analysts were somehow able to observe and 
manipulate systems from a perch above them.  He states, “It is 
difficult to use power effectively unless it is studied and observed 
from an appropriate vantage point. For Foucault, the vantage point 
starts at the ‘panopticon’” (p. 28).  Mills suggests that intelligence 
analysts are akin to the guards in Bentham’s “panoptic prison,” able 
to observe and control subjects from a central position. Foucault 
would presumably reject that analogy because it risks creating the 
perception that analysts themselves are somehow removed from 
the discourse in which operate. Major Mills thus acknowledges that 
the panopticon as he describes it is “not exactingly adapted by 
Foucault” (p. 29).
Nevertheless, Mills does acknowledge that “there are many 
operational panopticons in the military. Airborne command, 
control, and surveillance systems take their place as high-tech, 
mobile observation points” (p. 30). Major Mills cites a passage in 
The Archeology of Knowledge to link these military technologies to 
Foucault’s ideas: “‘Thus, through spatial ordering, the panopticon 
brings together power, control of the body, control of groups, and 
knowledge’” (p. 37).  However, his discussion of power ultimately 
misses the importance of the panoptic gaze. The usefulness of the 
panopticon is not primarily in its ability to surveil multiple targets 
simultaneously.  Its utility instead lies in producing self-regulation 
based on a perception (real or imagined) of continuous 
surveillance. Major Mills never addresses the contradiction 
wrought by the military’s panoptic high-technology, i.e., massive 
increases in government surveillance of foreign countries, non-state 
actors, and one’s own citizens has not led to corresponding 
reductions in U.S. security posture or armed conflict. Such 
technology has resulted, however, in sparking anxiety among 
citizens who are concerned that their every move might be 
monitored, recorded, and analyzed by government agencies (Der 
Derian, 1992).
Major Mills is more on the mark with his discussion of how the 
panopticon serves to “control the controllers” (p. 31): “From 
controlling who has information access through panoptic 
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background investigations to centralized control of access mediums
—message traffic, encrypted Internet Web sites, and 
compartmented programs—intelligence agencies carry many of the 
same watermarks of Bentham’s original panopticon blueprint” (p. 
31). Mills is writing for an audience that may be reluctant to engage 
in critical self-examination. Therefore he quickly turns his attention 
from self-regulation to how Foucault helps to “magnify the often-
hidden power conduits in an adversary’s structure” (p. 31, emphasis 
added).  He abandons his scrutiny of the U.S. national security 
apparatus prematurely. So in the next section of this essay, I take 
up his examination with the help of rhetorical scholars who have 
articulated useful Foucauldian approaches to studying institutional 
discourses.
Foucault and Force Enhancement
Major Mills states that his purpose in writing “The Role of 
Rhetorical Theory” is “to share my widened rhetorical 
understanding with young officers attending initial intelligence 
training” (p. xiii). Major Mills claims, “For those who can see and 
wield it, theory serves as a force enhancement and a catalyst for 
powerful paradigm shifts” (p. xiv). Here, skillful “wielding” of 
rhetorical theory is promoted as a way to meet core institutional 
goals of analytical “effectiveness” and “quality.” For Major Mills, the 
need for increased intelligence effectiveness and quality is clear.  
“The 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon underscored a critical need to modify our understanding 
of the enemy point of view” (p. 55). Mills concludes that a better 
understanding of rhetorical theory can assist the intelligence 
community in its ability to “adapt and thwart failure,” stating: “The 
end result of an enhanced understanding of theory is an adaptive 
intelligence organization that is able to provide a comprehensive 
view of the battle space to war fighters” (pp. 56-57). 
Major Mills’s essay can thus be interpreted as an artifact of the 
U.S. military’s enduring pursuit of absolute control of the 
battlefield.  This pursuit is represented in technocratic, “closed-
world” discourse (Edwards, 1997).  Contemporary examples of this 
discourse include “Total Battlefield Awareness” and “Joint 
Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment” with 
their seductive promises of “superior” knowledge and military 
dominance (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009). For Edwards (1997), 
“Closed-world discourse, through metaphors, techniques, and 
fictions as well as equipment and salient experiences, linked the 
globalist, hegemonic aims of post-World War II American foreign 
policy with a high-technology military strategy, an ideology of 
apocalyptic struggle, and a language of integrated systems” (pp. 
7-8). Toward this end, Major Mills’s essay attempts to enroll 
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Foucault’s rhetorical theory in support of a post-9/11 “technological 
utopia,” i.e., “a chaotic and dangerous space rendered orderly and 
controllable by the powers of rationality and technology” (p. 72).
As a result, assertions such as, “Intelligence officers can excel as 
‘power boosters’ and/or ‘surge protectors’ in order to maintain an 
optimal balance in the flow of ‘juice’” (p. 32) demonstrate Major 
Mills’s lack of reflexivity.  Mills avoids asking questions that might 
concern Foucault, such as: 
1) For whom is the “flow of juice” optimally balanced?” 
2) What are the defining discursive features and conditions 
of “optimal balance?” and most significantly; 
3) What role does the discourse of intelligence play in 
perpetuating U.S.-led systems of domination and 
control? 
Declarations such as, “If you can understand both your own and the 
adversary’s discourse formation, you can better identify pivot points 
to reinforce, degrade, or attack” (p. 33) do not clearly point to the 
relevance of Foucault’s ideas—intelligence analysts certainly do not 
need Foucault to tell them to “comprehend the enemy point of 
view” (p. 34) or beware “enemy deception” (p. 42).
Major Mills states in the Preface to “The Role of Rhetorical 
Theory,” “I never fully grasped the rhetorical framework behind 
these critical modes of communication [intelligence] until I was 
exposed to discourse theory at the University of Arkansas at Little 
Rock” (xiii). He credits several “professional mentors” from the 
Department of Rhetoric and Writing in his acknowledgements. 
Despite his academic training, Major Mills provides a distorted 
application of Foucault’s theories. Admittedly, the essay is written 
for an audience unfamiliar with Foucault’s ideas. Nevertheless, the 
value of the essay for its target audience is questionable. Major 
Mills is correct when he states, “Obviously, our intelligence 
capabilities do not allow a complete, unhindered view of an 
adversary’s discourse infrastructures” (p. 37). Given the complexity 
of Foucault’s ideas, intelligence analysts and scholars alike ought to 
be wary of unelaborated assertions such as “If you can understand 
how to isolate, block, or manipulate the discourse flow of any 
weapons system, you have effectively removed it as a threat” (p. 37).
In Chapter 6, “Discontinuity Fever,” Major Mills addresses the 
“complex shifts, ruptures, and discontinuities underlying the power 
structure” (p. 39). Major Mills never explicitly discusses what 
“discontinuity” means in the Foucauldian sense, but we can assume 
that he means that perceptions, descriptions, expressions, 
characterizations, and classifications rather suddenly change from 
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one historical period to the next (Foucault, 1980).  Mills’s goal in 
this section is to explain the essence and mode of transformation of 
power relations and to consider how change can be viewed and 
analyzed with the help of a rhetorical lens.  For example, he cites 
the death of Yugoslavian leader Marshal Tito in 1980 as an event 
that “created not only a power shift but a power rupture (creation of 
new power nodes) with innumerable discontinuities” (p. 40).  
Almost as an afterthought, he also states:
Iraq experienced a dramatic power shift in 2003. The regime 
change there opened many ruptures and discontinuities as this 
once repressed country gradually moves toward democracy. 
Observe the new power nodes that are established, modified, and 
removed as Iraq is returned to the control of its people (p. 40).
This passage is as disturbing for its silence regarding the role 
intelligence analysts themselves played in creating the “dramatic 
power shift” in Iraq in March 2003 as for its presumption about the 
direction in which change in Iraq will go.  It is likely that at the time 
of the essay’s publication in August 2003, Major Mills did not yet 
know how intelligence analysts had produced flawed assessments—
perpetuated and distorted by policymakers—leading to the invasion 
of Iraq under false pretenses (Hartnett & Stengrim, 2006; Mitchell, 
2006).  Still, already emerging questions regarding the quality of 
the underlying intelligence supporting the case for “discontinuity” 
in Iraq may have nevertheless prompted Major Mills to warn his 
readers: “Suspicious gaps in collection, suspicious confirmations, 
and contradictions to carefully researched patterns represent 
discontinuities underscored as key warning signs [of enemy 
deception]” (p. 42).
In summary, the most significant flaw in Major Mills’s 
treatment of Foucault is his failure to critically examine the role 
that intelligence analysts themselves play within the discursive 
system of national security.  Analysts are not objective observers 
perched above discourse/power “conduits.” As noted earlier, for 
Foucault, important questions about the production of knowledge 
were, “Who is speaking? What institutional role, legal status, social 
privilege, or educational or other certification determines who may 
claim the right to speak authoritatively” (Bizzell & Herzberg, 2001, 
p. 1433)?  In this sense, Major Mills’s essay puts the cart before the 
horse: “Discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of 
a thinking, knowing, speaking subject … On the contrary, [it is] a 
totality, in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity 
with himself may be determined” (Foucault, 1972, p. 55). Major 
Mills avoids directly addressing the implications of Foucault’s 
project of “freeing the individual from the ‘subjection’ of particular 
knowledge systems and power relations that ‘objectify’ him/
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her” (Blair, 1995, p. 129). To engage this issue head-on would 
undermine the very discursive system that generates the privileged 
roles that Major Mills and his fellow analysts occupy. In the next 
section, accordingly, I offer an alternative Foucauldian perspective 
on intelligence analysis that may shed more light on the 
interconnections between discursive practices and national security  
organizing than Major Mills evinces.
The Broader Implications of Foucault’s Theory for 
National Security
Few would argue with Major Mills’s motive:  Any theory, rhetorical 
or otherwise, that helps protect innocent lives by anticipating or 
helping avoid armed conflict is worthy of application. However, the 
discussion above suggests that Major Mill’s application of 
Foucault’s theories is problematic. Major Mill’s essay omits 
discussion of concepts that might help explain the role and function 
of intelligence analysts within the discursive system of U.S. national 
security. It is therefore necessary to supplement Major Mills’s 
perspective in order to understand the implications of Foucault’s 
theories for intelligence and national security organizing. Foss and 
Gill offer a useful supplement (Foss & Gill, 1987).  In their case 
study of Disneyland, the authors examine discursive practices, 
rules, roles, knowledge, and power in a way that compliments 
Major Mills’s focus on power and discontinuity.  Foss and Gill state 
that they selected Disneyland to illustrate Foucault’s rhetorical 
theory because the “Magic Kingdom” constitutes a fully-developed 
system of discursive acts that result in truth and knowledge of a 
particular kind.  
There are, in fact, concrete affinities and links between 
Disneyland and the U.S. national security apparatus when 
considered as discursive formations.  For example, the Chief 
Scientist for the U.S. Director of National Intelligence from 2005 to 
2007 was a former Executive Vice President at Walt Disney 
Imagineering. As reported by investigative journalist Lawrence 
Wright, the intelligence community turned to Walt Disney 
Imagineering to design the National Counter-Terrorism Center 
(NCTC) based in northern Virginia (Wright, 2009). As one former 
Disney executive at NCTC explained: “Even the chairs in the 
lunchroom are the same ones we had at the Disney Studios…. The 
only difference is these chairs don’t have the mouse ears” (n.p.). 
Wright reports that several former Disney executives entered 
government service after the September 11, 2001 attacks: “The 
fantasy worlds that Disney creates have a surprising amount in 
common with the ideal universe envisaged by the intelligence 
community, in which environments are carefully controlled and 
people are closely observed, and no one seems to mind” (n.p.). 
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Within Disneyland, Foss and Gill find that the design elements 
of the environment, the visitors’ role, and the image of the 
employees constitute the major discursive practices (1987). These 
are oddly similar to discursive practices within the national security  
domain: 1) preference for elite, insider perspectives which rely on 
classified information; 2) the image and status of “intelligence” as a 
form of knowledge and an object of discourse; and 3) the role of 
policymakers within the “intelligence cycle.” These discursive 
practices are reciprocal with national security rules, roles, 
knowledge, and power as explained below.
For Foucault, spatial design constitutes a discursive practice, 
and Foss and Gill highlight how the spatial elements within 
Disneyland regulate the flow and interaction of people. This 
spatially-oriented discursive practice within Disneyland has its 
counterpart within the U.S. intelligence community. Specifically, 
only those members of the intelligence community who have passed 
the requisite background investigations and polygraph tests are 
allowed to enter what is called a SCIF (Sensitive Compartmented 
Information Facility). SCIFs contain classified information 
necessary for producing intelligence assessments.i SCIF 
construction requirements ensure a regulated flow of authorized 
people within an intelligence agency or private contractor facility. 
The discourse surrounding SCIFs also reinforces the image of 
intelligence work as secret, elite, and valuable. Specifically, certain 
types of SCIFs require “a response force capable of responding to 
an alarm within 15 minutes after annunciation and a reserve 
response force available to assist the responding force” (Wieser, 
2003). The spatial elements that regulate the flow of people within 
the intelligence system also mirror classification schemes which 
regulate the flow of information within the system.
Classification systems and compartmentalization create extreme 
secrecy within national security discourse. Foucault’s critique of the 
“repressive hypothesis”—the hypothesis that power relations 
generally take the form of prohibition, censorship, or non-
recognition—suggests that this secrecy will have striking 
consequences from a rhetorical perspective. As Biesecker notes, 
Foucault alters the meaning of censorship by seeing in it not a ban 
on talk, but instead, a mechanism for an explosion of discourses 
(Biesecker, 1992, p. 353).  Foucault’s critique of the repressive 
hypothesis was in relation to sexuality.  However, the same 
principles apply in the case of national security and, in addition, 
explain why intelligence generates an allure, creating an eager 
audience for spy movies, television programs, books, and news. 
This allure generates a certain cultural context and understanding 
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of national security issues which, in turn, imbues intelligence 
analysis and policymaking. ii
The idea of “authenticity” offers another parallel between the 
discursive practices of Disneyland and the national security 
apparatus. In Disneyland, the design features are primarily 
synthetic. Omitted from the “frontiers,” “jungles,” or “waterways” 
are any natural occurrences that might offend customers (Foss & 
Gill, 1987). Similarly, within the intelligence community, dialogue, 
interaction, and authentic understanding of foreign cultures are 
notoriously lacking (9-11 Commission, 2004; Commission on the 
Intelligence Capabilities, 2005). This fact is unsurprising given that 
classification schemes, spatial configurations, and institutional 
strictures inhibit interaction with foreign nationals. For example, 
the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United 
States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (2005) indicated 
that the lack of authentic cultural understanding led, in part, to the 
intelligence community’s failure to accurately assess the WMD 
threat that Iraq posed to the United States.iii Like Disneyland, 
discursive practices within the intelligence community reinforce 
inauthentic portrayals and limit the possibility of interaction with 
foreign nationals who might otherwise challenge institutional 
preconceptions.
Within Disneyland, the role of visitors is passive despite the 
interactivity depicted in the organization’s publicity materials. 
Likewise, within the intelligence community, the mantra of 
“support the policymaker” obscures the fact that very few 
policymakers engage directly with the intelligence community. 
Most policymakers, similar to Disneyland patrons, are passive 
consumers. According to noted intelligence scholar and insider, 
Mark Lowenthal, intelligence consumers are presented with a 
largely standardized repertoire of intelligence products, i.e., “a set 
product line” (2006, p. 62). Policymaker feedback within this 
discursive system is rare.
Foss and Gill’s reading of Foucault thus supplements Major 
Mills’ and allows us to assess some of the broader implications of 
Foucault’s theory for national security organizing. National security  
is a powerful discursive system that relies on antidemocratic, 
closed, and tightly regulated discourse to nominally protect the 
interests of the “American people.” The discursive practices of 
intelligence classification and compartmentalization cloak 
intelligence analysis and national security policy in secrecy and 
reinforce their status as objects of discourse better left to national 
security elites and insiders—not citizens. The extreme seclusion of 
the typical intelligence analyst—from both foreign nationals and 
U.S. policymakers—constitutes a discursive practice that distorts 
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analytical priorities and judgments which, in turn, distorts 
policymaking and public understanding. These discursive practices 
consistently generate power relations that promote secrecy, 
mistrust, and groupthink within this institution (WMD 
Commission, 2005). Finally, within Disneyland, surveillance is 
ubiquitous. Foss and Gill do not explicitly acknowledge that 
freedom of movement within its environs is permitted by one’s 
participation in a comprehensive system of monitoring. In addition 
to the artifacts and experiences that Foss and Gill describe, 
surveillance contributes to practices that “embody rules and power 
relations that promote wholesome, sterile, and predictable behavior 
and that produce rhetors who fill passive, clean, unquestioning 
roles” (Foss & Gill, 1987, p. 397). Here we might consider how the 
intelligence community’s massive, high-tech effort to overtly and 
covertly intercept and monitor most of the world’s electronic 
signals, in part, mimics Disneyland’s goals and design.    
Conclusion: Foucault’s Relevance to Rhetorical Studies
Herzberg states that “scholars have cited Foucault dutifully as a 
powerful influence on modern epistemological skepticism, but he 
seems to have had little place in the classroom” (1991, p. 80). Thus, 
some may find Major Mills’s attempt to pragmatically 
“operationalize” Foucault’s theories in the context of military 
intelligence analysis laudable, but it is unlikely Foucault will 
become standard reading for analyst trainees anytime soon. 
Treating Foucault’s rhetorical theory as a “powerful military-
intelligence force multiplier” ala Major Mills limits the theory’s 
explanatory power in the case of intelligence and national security 
organizing. However, following Blair’s (1987) contribution, scholars 
can make the following observations about Foucault’s relevance to 
rhetorical theory, and by extension, to the study of intelligence and 
national security institutions. 
First, for Foucault, an act of discourse is an act of power. The 
United States’ power is, of course, measured in material (military 
and economic) strength, but its power also manifests in and 
through discursive (i.e., symbolic) hegemony. Second, engaging in 
national security affairs requires enacting discursive rules and 
roles. As a discursive system, national security requires intelligence 
analysts, officials, policymakers, threats, and numerous other 
discursive positions to be filled. Third, according to Blair, “It was 
Foucault’s contention that we should examine the exterior of a 
statement, its relationship to other statements, rather than to look 
toward the statement’s interior, its author’s intended 
meaning” (1987, p. 378). This concept takes on new relevance in 
light of intelligence failures preceding the 2003 Iraq War. We may 
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learn more about the workings of national security discourse/
power/knowledge by looking at a text in relation to public 
statements made by top administration officials than by looking 
“inside” the text itself. Fourth, discourse is contextual and 
contingent. The same words may be repeated by the same speaker 
to the same audience yet constitute different meanings. 
Blair notes that the list of Foucault’s contributions to rhetoric 
could be taken much further, and the same can be said for his 
potential contributions to the study of U.S. national security 
organizing (1987, p. 379). The connection between Foucault’s 
theories, rhetoric, and intelligence and national security 
institutions provide scholars with an engaging set of problems. 
Viewed as the interplay among institutional knowledge, power, and 
discourse, communication scholars interested in studying 
intelligence and national security can easily find Foucault’s 
sanction. Application of Foucault’s theories within this arena 
remains a challenging opportunity yet to be further explored.
© Hamilton Bean, 2010.
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ii Formally, a SCIF is defined as “an accredited area, room, group of 
rooms, buildings, or installation where SCI (Sensitive 
Compartmented Information) may be stored, used, discussed, and/
or processed” (Wieser, 2003). 
ii For a detailed discussion of this process, see James Der Derian’s 
Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War (1991). 
iii The Commission Report states: “The October 2002 NIE [National 
Intelligence Estimate] contained an extensive technical analysis of 
Iraq’s suspected weapons programs but little serious analysis of the 
socio-political situation in Iraq, or the motives and intentions of 
Iraqi leadership—which, in a dictatorship like Iraq, really meant 
understanding Saddam. It seems unlikely to us that weapons 
experts used to combing reports for tidbits on technical programs 
would ever have asked: ‘Is Saddam bluffing?’ or ‘Could he have 
decided to suspend his weapons programs until sanctions are 
lifted?’ But an analyst steeped in Iraq’s politics and culture at least 
might have asked those questions, and, of course, those turn out to 
be the questions that could have led the Intelligence Community 
closer to the truth.”
